The driving force behind market economies is that voluntary exchanges are mutually beneficial. Millions of buyers and sellers pursuing their own interests engage in billions of exchanges, each creating value on both sides. These transactions generate market prices, which help guide people and businesses toward the best use of their efforts and resources. The price system allows for the synchronization of vast amounts of production and consumption across the nation and around the globe.
Markets generate cooperation between people with different values and goals, and create an environment open to innovation. Markets thrive on diversity and allow for people to pursue different lifestyles, careers, and consumption choices. F. A. Hayek said that the market “reconciles different knowledge and different purposes which, whether the individuals be selfish or not, will greatly differ from one person to another.”[i] Economist Thomas Sowell noted that “the diversity of tastes satisfied by a market may be its greatest economic achievement.”[ii]
Decisions Are Guesswork
The government does not work like this. Rather than voluntary exchange, it generally relies on coercion to pursue its ends. One consequence is that we cannot be sure that government actions generate net value. Because the government’s activities are not based on mutually beneficial coordination, there is no sure source of information indicating whether or not they are useful. This is a fundamental weakness of government.
Federal agencies impose more than 3,000 new regulations each year.[iii] Total federal regulations now span 168,000 pages.[iv] The government will spend about $4 trillion this year and distribute benefits to people through more than 2,300 programs.[v] Needless to say, the federal government is making a vast number of decisions affecting every aspect of our lives.
In making its spending and regulatory decisions, the government is flying blind. Regulations are top-down requirements for action or restraint, not efforts at finding voluntary agreement. Federal spending relies on compulsory taxation, not customer revenue. Without voluntary agreement behind its actions, the government faces a large information void. There is no system of supply and demand, prices, and profits to inform policymakers if their activities are generating net benefits to society. Policymakers may believe that their interventions make sense, but that is usually wishful thinking based on guesswork.
Consider the purchase of aircraft. In the private sector, an airline chooses the number of planes to buy on the basis of demand for air travel, which is aggregated from individual preferences expressed in the marketplace. By contrast, when the Pentagon buys aircraft, the number chosen is decided by political factors and guesswork regarding threats. No market generates information about the benefits of a threat reduction.
More broadly, no reliable mechanism exists to help the government make efficient choices across alternative uses of funds. Would fighter jets, farm subsidies, or food stamps be the best use of added funds? In markets, tradeoffs are made with the help of prices. If the price of air travel goes up, consumers reduce their air travel and increase their automobile travel. But in the government, decisions on allocating its vast budget are not based on solid metrics.
In theory, government decisionmaking could be aided by cost-benefit analysis.[vi] Experts could try to tally up all the monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits of proposed actions, and the government could choose those options with the highest net returns. Since 1981, federal agencies have been required to perform such analyses for major regulatory actions.[vii] However, these analyses have often been of low quality because of a lack of accurate data and the use of dubious assumptions.[viii] Furthermore, experience shows that regulatory cost-benefit analyses are often biased in favor of the predetermined answers that government leaders favor.[ix] As a result, these analyses have often been paperwork exercises that have not improved decisionmaking.
With spending programs, some agencies perform cost-benefit analyses for some programs, but there is no broad requirement to do so.[x] To the extent that such analyses are performed, the process shows similar shortcomings as regulatory analyses. The Army Corps of Engineers, for example, has long performed cost-benefit analysis on projects. But outside experts have complained that the agency’s analyses are biased in favor of project approval—the Corps tends to overestimate the benefits of projects and underestimate the costs.[xi] Investigations “have repeatedly caught the Corps skewing its analyses to justify wasteful and destructive projects that keep its employees busy and its congressional patrons happy.”[xii] A Government Accountability Office report in 2006 found that the analyses supporting some Corps’ projects were “fraught with errors, mistakes and miscalculations, and used invalid assumptions and outdated data.”[xiii]
Perhaps federal cost-benefit analyses could be insulated from politics and made more rigorous. If so, the technique could be used for more spending decisions within agencies.[xiv] The Department of Homeland Security, for example, needs more rigor in its decisionmaking process for capital investments.[xv] However, it seems unlikely that such analyses would ever be used for broad allocation decisions by Congress, such as divvying up the budget between defense, housing, transportation, and other categories.[xvi]
In sum, decisionmaking in the market is a reality-based system rooted in individual preferences and trade-offs. By contrast, government decisions are based on guesswork. That is one reason why there is so much failure in Washington—and also why there is so much bickering. Everybody has a strong opinion about how to carve up spending and impose regulations, but nobody has hard data.
Funding Guaranteed
In markets, individuals and businesses often make bad decisions. But if they continue down the wrong path, their resources get depleted. A business making misguided investments will be punished by financial losses and may face bankruptcy or a takeover. About 10 percent of all U.S. companies go out of business each year, which is a remarkably high exit rate.[xvii] But losses and business failures prompt the beneficial reallocation of resources to more promising activities.
If government leaders are no more skilled than business leaders, their efforts will also have a high failure rate. But government activities that create no value can live on forever because the funding comes from a mandatory source: taxes. In theory, policymakers could rigorously analyze programs and then reallocate spending based on informed judgments about the successes and failures. But that usually does not happen in the federal government for reasons discussed in subsequent sections.
How about successful activities? Businesses that do a good job serving customers will earn high profits, at least until the profits are eaten away by competition. The quest for profits guides businesses toward generating net value. In government, there is no such guide. Federal subsidy programs may attract many recipients, or “customers,” but that is not an indicator of success—or net value creation—because it does not take into account program costs.
People might assume that government has an advantage in tackling society’s problems because it is a powerful institution that can use coercion. Actually, the fact that government has a compulsory revenue stream is a huge weakness that leads it astray. In markets, strong feedback mechanisms prompt rapid adjustments when failures arise, but in government there is usually too much inertia to make needed changes. To a large extent, government failure is baked into the cake because its misguided actions are not self-limiting the way that private actions are.
Winners and Losers
People in markets generally act in their own self-interest in pursuing their goals and trading with others. At first blush, that seems like an anti-social bias—an environment that creates winners and losers. But the opposite is true. In his 1776 classic, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith described how people in markets acting in their self-interest end up promoting the broader public good. An individual “intends only his own gain, and he is … led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.… By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”[xviii] People who work hard and allocate their resources to benefit themselves end up supporting overall prosperity. Their personal actions are socially beneficial.
F. A. Hayek expanded on Smith’s observations. He noted that in markets people “are induced to contribute to the needs of others without caring or even knowing about them.”[xix] And in markets, Hayek said, people “following their own interests, whether wholly egotistical or highly altruistic, will further the aims of many others.”[xx] Markets are a win-win proposition for participants, a positive-sum game.
It is a similar situation with all sorts of private activity, such as pursuing friendships, supporting charities, and promoting social projects. In such voluntary activities, people engage with others in mutually beneficial ways. Individuals, of course, make mistakes and sometimes pursue harmful activities, but in those situations the damage will be limited because others are not compelled to go along.
Governments do not work that way. Their activities tend to create winners and losers. Consider that in markets individuals choose their own levels of each good and service to consume. Markets allow for diversity. But government tends to have one-size-fits-all activities. That creates winners and losers because the chosen level of a government activity will differ from many people’s individual preferences. Economist James Buchanan called this loss caused by forced uniformity a “political externality” of government interventions.[xxi]
This suppression of individual choices in favor of top-down choices destroys value, and it is a key reason why every citizen should want to keep the sphere of government activities limited. Supporters of government control of activities seem to think that “people can be made better off by reducing their options.”[xxii] But rather than making people better off, government interventions often lead to unhappiness and social conflict.
In the 1840s, economist Frédéric Bastiat argued against France’s subsidies for religion, education, arts, and other activities because of the discord they created. He said, “All these vital forces of society should develop harmoniously under the influence of liberty and that none of them should become, as we see has happened today, a source of trouble, abuses, tyranny, and disorder.”[xxiii] Milton Friedman similarly argued that the use of government to try and solve problems “tends to strain the social cohesion essential for a stable society.”[xxiv] By contrast, he said, “the widespread use of the market reduces the strain on the social fabric by rendering conformity unnecessary with respect to any activities it encompasses.”[xxv]
When the government grows, divisions within society grow because more resources are distributed by coercive means rather than voluntary means. But with America’s increasingly pluralistic society, the last thing we need is more division being sown by one-size-fits-all federal policies. As “our society is becoming more diverse, the range of activities by the national government should be logically narrowed.”[xxvi]
All that said, federal activities can generate net value in some situations. The government can provide “public goods,” which are items we all benefit from, but that are underprovided by markets.[xxvii] National defense is a good example. And the government can generate value by fixing “externalities,” such as pollution.[xxviii] When it addresses these and other market failures, federal policies can be a win-win proposition that improves economic efficiency and increases welfare.[xxix] The challenge is to keep the government narrowly focused on these roles, and to tackle them effectively with a minimum of failure.
Taxes Create Deadweight Losses
When evaluating spending programs, policymakers should take into account the full costs of funding them. The direct cost of any program is the tax revenues the government will need to extract from the private sector. But another cost is created by the extraction process itself. Since taxes are compulsory, they induce people to try and avoid them by changing their working, investing, and consumption activities. Such responses harm the economy, a harm called a “deadweight loss.”
Suppose the government imposes a new tax on wine. Wine drinkers would be harmed because part of their money would be confiscated. But an additional cost, the deadweight loss, would be created as people cut back their wine consumption. Because of the tax, people would enjoy less wine and lose some amount of welfare or happiness.
Consider the damage caused by a wine tax of $1 per bottle. Before the tax is imposed, people consumed 100 million bottles at $10 per bottle. With the tax, the price rises and people reduce their consumption to 90 million bottles. A deadweight loss is caused by people reducing their consumption by 10 million bottles.[xxx]
While the tax revenue amount represents a loss for the private sector and a gain for the government, the deadweight loss is a loss to society as a whole. The government has blocked 10 million bottles worth of mutually beneficial exchanges from taking place. Every federal tax causes this sort of damage by hindering market exchanges. Income taxes, for example, reduce the working and investing efforts of millions of families and businesses.
How large are the deadweight losses of federal taxes? They vary depending on the tax rate, the type of tax, and other factors. But for the federal income tax, studies have found that, on average, the deadweight loss of raising taxes by a dollar is roughly 50 cents.[xxxi] Based on his pioneering work, Harvard University’s Martin Feldstein thinks that the loss may be higher, perhaps exceeding “one dollar per dollar of revenue raised, making the cost of incremental governmental spending more than two dollars for each dollar of government spending.”[xxxii] Other estimates are, however, lower than Feldstein’s.
Suppose that Congress is considering spending $10 billion on an energy subsidy program. Putting aside whether the program is ethical or constitutional, does the program make any economic sense? The program’s benefits would have to be higher than the total cost of about $15 billion, which includes the $10 billion direct cost to taxpayers plus another $5 billion in deadweight losses.[xxxiii]
Currently, federal lawmakers do not consider deadweight losses when they make spending decisions, but they should. The scorekeeper of Congress, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), generally does not include deadweight losses in its analyses. Federal agencies generally do not consider deadweight losses either, even though the Office of Management and Budget has recommended that they be included in program evaluations.[xxxiv]
The absence of deadweight loss information biases policymakers in favor of approving programs.[xxxv] Consider the debate over the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. Health scholar Chris Conover estimated that ACA-imposed taxes would create up to about $500 billion of deadweight losses during the law’s first decade, which was in addition to the bill’s official cost of about $1 trillion.[xxxvi] If such an estimate had been provided to Congress by the CBO in 2010, it might have changed the debate over the legislation.
To see why deadweight losses can result in government failure, let’s compare a private charitable project to a government program. Suppose that a philanthropist creates a $10 million project to help disadvantaged individuals, and the program generates $12 million in benefits. It would be a success. Now suppose a similar program is run by the government. It would be a failure because it would use tax funding and thus generate deadweight losses. The government program would cost $10 million directly plus another $5 million or so in deadweight losses, for a total cost that was higher than the benefits. Since government projects are funded by compulsory taxes, they are more costly than private projects. Coercion is not free.
[i] F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 110.
[ii] Sowell goes on to say that diversity “is also its greatest political vulnerability” because many people and political leaders have a desire to impose their values on others. Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions, p. 42.
[iii] These are “final rules” published in the Federal Register. See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., “Ten Thousand Commandments 2014,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, 2014, p. 2.
[iv] This number is the total page count in the Code of Federal Regulations. See Crews Jr., “Ten Thousand Commandments 2014,” p. 63.
[v] Chris Edwards, “Independence in 1776; Dependence in 2014,” Cato at Liberty (blog), Cato Institute, July 3, 2014. By 2015, the number of programs had topped 2,300. See www.cfda.gov.
[vi] Most public finance textbooks provide background on cost-benefit analysis. See David N. Hyman, Public Finance: A Contemporary Application of Theory to Policy (Mason, Ohio: Thomson South-Western, 2005), chap. 6. Or see Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance: Sixth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), chap. 11.
[vii] President Reagan issued Exec. Order No. 12291 in 1981 mandating the use of cost-benefit analysis for significant regulatory actions, which are those that have an impact of more than $100 million a year. This order was superseded by President Clinton’s Exec. Order No. 12866 in 1993. “Independent” federal agencies are exempt from the requirements, including most of the agencies that impose financial regulations.
[viii] Susan E. Dudley, “OMB’s Reported Benefits of Regulation: Too Good to Be True?” Regulation 36, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 26–30.
[ix] Jerry Ellig, “Improving Regulatory Impact Analysis through Process Reform,” testimony June 26, 2013, before the Joint Economic Committee Hearing “Reducing Unnecessary and Costly Red Tape through Smarter Regulations”.
[x] The Office of Management and Budget’s “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs” (Circular A-94, October 29, 1992), establishes guidelines for cost-benefit analyses within agencies.
[xi] Chris Edwards, “Cutting the Army Corps of Engineers,” DownsizingGovernment.org, Cato Institute, March 2012. And see Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin, 1993).
[xii] Michael Grunwald, “Reining in the Corps of Engineers,” Time, September 20, 2007.
[xiii] Government Accountability Office, “Corps of Engineers: Observations on Planning and Project Management Processes for the Civil Works Program,” GAO-06-529T, March 15, 2006, p. 5.
[xiv] For suggestions on improving regulatory cost-benefit analyses, see Susan E. Dudley, testimony June 26, 2013, before the Joint Economic Committee Hearing, “Reducing Unnecessary and Costly Red Tape through Smarter Regulations.” And see Robert W. Hahn and Erin M. Layburn, “Tracking the Value of Regulation,” Regulation 26, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 16–21.
[xv] Chris Edwards, “Terminating the Department of Homeland Security,” DownsizingGovernment.org, Cato Institute, November 2014.
[xvi] In cost-benefit analyses, costs and benefits imposed on different people are tallied in dollars, and if the latter are larger than the former the project is deemed beneficial. The procedure assumes that it is appropriate for the government to impose losses on some people as long as others gain more. But, of course, that does not take into account more fundamental values such as individual rights.
[xvii] Brian Headd, Alfred Nucci, and Richard Boden, “What Matters More: Business Exit Rates or Business Survival Rates?” U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics Brief 4, 2010. European statistics also show a roughly 10 percent exit rate. See “Business Demography Statistics” in Eurostat Statistics Explained, December 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Business_demography_statistics.
[xviii] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), vol. 1, bk 4, chap. 2.
[xix] Hayek, “The Market Order or Catallaxy,” in Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2, p. 109.
[xxi] Buchanan, “Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins,” in The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1, p. 66. See also James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Volume 2 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004). Political externalities (or “external costs”) would be eliminated in a political system based on unanimous agreement. But a requirement for unanimity would impose high decisionmaking costs. The Calculus of Consent examines the tradeoffs an individual might consider between the external costs and decisionmaking costs of government.
[xxiii] Frédéric Bastiat, “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen,” in Selected Essays on Political Economy (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 1995), p. 13.
[xxv] Ibid., p. 24. Murray Rothbard made similar observations. On markets, he said, “there is a harmony of interests, for everyone demonstrably gains in utility from market exchange. Where government intervenes, on the other hand, caste conflict is thereby created, for one man benefits at the expense of another.” See Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and the Economy (Menlo Park, CA: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970), p. 126.
[xxvi] William S. Peirce, “Government: An Expensive Provider,” in Limiting Leviathan, ed. Donald P. Racheter and Richard E. Wagner (Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1999), p. 57.
[xxvii] Public goods are usually defined as those that are “nonrivalrous” and “nonexcludable.” Nonrivalrous means that one person’s use of the good is not reduced as others use more of it. Nonexcludable means that once a good is provided, it is difficult to exclude anyone from consuming it. National defense is a classic public good. See Tyler Cowen, “Public Goods,” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, accessed June 4, 2015, www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html.
[xxviii] Externalities occur when production or consumption activities of one person have an effect on another person outside of the price system. There is a large literature examining whether market failures have occurred in particular situations and whether the government should try to fix them given the government’s own tendency to fail. Economist Ronald Coase famously described how private parties could agree to efficient solutions with respect to externalities without government intervention if transaction costs are low.
[xxix] The main idea of efficiency used by economists is “Pareto efficiency.” An efficient outcome is one where nobody can be made better off without somebody being made worse off. Put another way, resources are allocated to their most productive uses. Perfectly functioning competitive markets achieve Pareto efficiency.
[xxx] The measure of deadweight loss is often called a “Harberger triangle” after the economist who popularized the measurement of these losses, Arnold Harberger. Deadweight loss is also called “excess burden,” For an excellent review of the development of deadweight loss theory, see James R. Hines, “Three Sides of Harberger Triangles,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 6852, December 1998.
[xxxi] Chris Conover surveyed the literature and reported an average of 44 cents for the marginal cost of all federal taxes, and 50 cents for federal income taxes. Christopher J. Conover, “Congress Should Account for the Excess Burden of Taxation” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 669, October 13, 2010. See also Edgar K. Browning, Stealing from Each Other: How the Welfare State Robs Americans of Money and Spirit (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008), pp. 156, 166, 178.The Congressional Budget Office has stated, “Typical estimates of the economic cost of a dollar of tax revenue range from 20 cents to 60 cents over and above the revenue raised.” See Congressional Budget Office, “Budget Options,” February 2001, p. 381.
[xxxii] Martin Feldstein, “How Big Should Government Be?” National Tax Journal, vol. 50, no. 2 (June 1997): 197–213.
[xxxiii] If the subsidy program were funded by borrowing, it would delay tax payments to the future, but the deadweight losses could be even higher. Browning, Stealing from Each Other, p. 166.
[xxxiv] The White House issued guidelines for cost-benefit analyses in 1992 that recommended that agencies multiply project costs by 1.25 to take into account the deadweight losses from taxation. But these procedures are not a hard mandate and, I am told, are not widely used. The guidelines are Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-94 Revised (October 29, 1992). As an example of a detailed federal cost-benefit analysis, Mathematica prepared a 98-page analysis of Job Corps on contract to the Department of Labor in 2006. The study did not include the deadweight loss of tax financing. It found that the benefits of the program were $3,544 per participant, while the costs were $16,205 per participant. That creates a net loss of $10,300 per participant. The inclusion of deadweight losses would have made the net losses even higher. See Peter Z. Schochet, John Burghardt, and Sheena McConnell, “National Job Corps Study and Longer-Term Follow-Up Study,” Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., August 2006.
[xxxv] In addition to deadweight losses, policymakers leave out other costs when comparing government activities to private activities. For one thing, they leave out the opportunity costs of their assets, such as the rental value of government-owned properties. See Antonio Afonso, Ludger Schuknecht, and Vito Tanzi, “Public Sector Efficiency,” European Central Bank Working Paper 581, January 2006.
[xxxvi] Christopher J. Conover, “Congress Should Account for the Excess Burden of Taxation,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 669, October 13, 2010.